Event Studies and Fama–MacBeth

Data Analytics for Finance

Caspar David Peter

Rotterdam School of Management, Accounting Department

Event Studies and Fama–MacBeth

Before We Start…

Assignment Release and Submission Schedule

Assignment Release Deadline Graded
A1 11.02.2026 25.02.2026 \(\checkmark\)
A2 11.02.2026 25.02.2026 \(\checkmark\)
A3 18.02.2026 04.03.2026
A4 25.02.2026 11.03.2026
A5 04.03.2026 18.03.2026
A6 11.03.2026 25.03.2026

Assignment 5 Is Out!

A5 asks you to implement a full event study on the Dieselgate data. Everything we cover today is directly relevant. Deadline: March 18, 2026.

Overview

Where we are in the research pipeline

Today we add two specialized tools for finance research: event studies for measuring market reactions to specific events, and Fama–MacBeth regressions for testing whether firm characteristics systematically predict returns over time.

Overview

Today’s learning objectives

  • Understand the logic of event studies as a causal inference tool for measuring stock price reactions
  • Define estimation and event windows, estimate expected return models, and calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)
  • Compare the Market Model and Fama–French 3-Factor Model as benchmarks for expected returns
  • Understand the Fama–MacBeth two-step procedure for cross-sectional asset pricing tests
  • Recognize when to use event studies vs. Fama–MacBeth vs. the panel methods from L4
  • Appreciate recent methodological advances connecting event studies to causal inference

From DiD to Event Studies

From DiD to Event Studies

What’s new, what’s familiar

What you already know (L3–L4)

  • OLS identifies cross-sectional relationships
  • DiD exploits within-group variation over time
  • Both ask: “What would have happened without the treatment?”
  • The parallel trends assumption provides the counterfactual in DiD

What’s new today

  • Event studies ask the same counterfactual question, but at daily frequency and for specific corporate or market events
  • The “counterfactual” is now the expected return from a factor model, not a parallel trend from a control group
  • Short event windows (days, not months/years) help with identification

From DiD to Event Studies

When to use what

Method Best for Identification Time scale
OLS (L3) Cross-sectional relationships Controls + research design Cross-section
DiD / Panel FE (L4) Policy changes, treatment rollouts Parallel trends + FE Months–years
Event study (L5) Market reactions to specific events Market efficiency + factor model Days
Fama–MacBeth (L5) Systematic return predictability Repeated cross-sections Months–years

Each method makes different assumptions to construct the counterfactual. No single method dominates — the right choice depends on the research question and data structure.

From DiD to Event Studies

Why event studies work — The efficient market hypothesis

Event studies rely on a version of the semi-strong form of market efficiency (Fama 1970):

Stock prices quickly incorporate all publicly available information. When new information arrives, prices adjust rapidly — abnormal returns are concentrated in a short window around the event.

Identification assumption

The event study identification assumption is analogous to parallel trends in DiD. In DiD we assume: absent treatment, treated and control groups would have followed the same trend. In event studies we assume: absent the event, the stock would have earned its expected return from the factor model.

From DiD to Event Studies

Our research question

“What was the stock market reaction to the Dieselgate scandal announcement on September 18, 2015?”

On this date, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a Notice of Violation to Volkswagen for using illegal “defeat devices” in diesel engines. The question is whether — and how much — investors punished German automakers relative to non-German competitors.

Roadmap: Five steps to an event study

  1. Define the event and time windows
  2. Estimate a model of expected returns (Market Model or FF3)
  3. Calculate abnormal returns (AR = actual − expected)
  4. Aggregate abnormal returns into cumulative abnormal returns (CAR)
  5. Test whether CARs are statistically and economically significant

Event Study Methodology

Event Study Methodology

Step 1: Define the event

Event date: September 18, 2015

  • EPA issues Notice of Violation — a public, well-dated, exogenous shock
  • This is what makes Dieselgate a clean event: clear date, public information, limited anticipation

What makes a “good” event for event studies?

  • Precise timing: The exact date of information arrival is known
  • Surprise content: The event contains genuinely new information
  • No confounding events: Other major news does not coincide with the event date
  • Limited information leakage: Insider trading or rumours have not pre-empted the announcement

Event Study Methodology

Step 1: Define the windows

  • Estimation window [−120, −30]: 91 trading days of “business as usual” returns to estimate the expected return model
  • Gap [−29, −1]: Buffer to prevent event contamination from leaking into the estimation
  • Event window [0, +5]: Six trading days over which we measure the market reaction
  • Why [0, +5]? The market may take several days to fully incorporate complex information — but longer windows introduce more noise

Event Study Methodology

Step 2: The Market Model

The simplest expected return model:

\[R_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_i R_{m,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}\]

Components

  • \(R_{i,t}\): Stock return for firm \(i\) on day \(t\)
  • \(R_{m,t}\): Market index return (e.g. DAX for German firms)
  • \(\alpha_i\): Firm-specific average return not explained by the market
  • \(\beta_i\): Sensitivity to market movements (market beta)
  • \(\varepsilon_{i,t}\): Idiosyncratic return — the “surprise”

Connection to L3

This is just OLS! We regress firm returns on market returns using only the estimation window.

Event Study Methodology

Step 2: Estimation window — Fitting the model

What happens in the estimation window?

  • We estimate \(\hat{\alpha}_i\) and \(\hat{\beta}_i\) using OLS on [−120, −30] only
  • These parameters capture the firm’s “normal” relationship with the market
  • The estimation window must be before the event to avoid contamination

Intuition

If VW stock typically moves 1.2% for every 1% move in the DAX (\(\hat{\beta} = 1.2\)), and earns an extra 0.01% per day on average (\(\hat{\alpha} = 0.0001\)), then on any given day we can predict what VW “should” have returned — absent any firm-specific news.

Event Study Methodology

Step 2: Choosing a benchmark model

Model Formula Pros Cons
Market Model \(R_i = \alpha + \beta R_m + \varepsilon\) Simple, intuitive, widely used Ignores size/value effects
CAPM \(R_i - R_f = \beta (R_m - R_f) + \varepsilon\) Theoretical foundation Constrains \(\alpha = 0\)
Fama–French 3-Factor \(R_i - R_f = \alpha + \beta_{mkt}(R_m - R_f) + \beta_{smb}SMB + \beta_{hml}HML + \varepsilon\) Controls for size and value More parameters to estimate

For short-window studies, the model choice typically does not matter much. We will verify this by comparing Market Model and FF3 results in A5.

Event Study Methodology

Step 3: The Fama–French 3-Factor Model

\[R_{i,t} - R_{f,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_{mkt}(R_{m,t} - R_{f,t}) + \beta_{smb}\, SMB_t + \beta_{hml}\, HML_t + \varepsilon_{i,t}\]

The two additional factors

  • SMB (Small Minus Big): Return difference between small-cap and large-cap portfolios → captures size risk
  • HML (High Minus Low): Return difference between high book-to-market (value) and low book-to-market (growth) stocks → captures value risk

Why bother?

If German automakers are systematically large, value firms, the Market Model may attribute some of their normal return to alpha when it is actually compensation for size and value exposure. FF3 controls for this — reducing potential misattribution bias in the abnormal return calculation.

Event Study Methodology

Step 4: Abnormal returns — The “surprise”

\[AR_{i,t} = R_{i,t} - \hat{E}[R_{i,t}]\]

  • \(R_{i,t}\): What the stock actually returned on day \(t\)
  • \(\hat{E}[R_{i,t}]\): What we predicted it would return, given the market
  • \(AR_{i,t}\): The abnormal return — the part unexplained by normal market movements

Sanity check

In the estimation window, the mean abnormal return should be approximately zero — because we estimated the model on that data. If \(\bar{AR} \neq 0\) in the estimation window, something has gone wrong. This is the event study equivalent of checking OLS residuals.

Event Study Methodology

Step 4: Interpreting abnormal returns

What does AR mean?

  • \(AR > 0\): Stock did better than expected → positive surprise
  • \(AR < 0\): Stock did worse than expected → negative surprise
  • \(AR \approx 0\): Stock behaved as the model predicted → no news

Market Model AR

\[AR_{i,t}^{MM} = R_{i,t} - \hat{\alpha}_i - \hat{\beta}_i R_{m,t}\]

FF3 AR

\[AR_{i,t}^{FF3} = R_{i,t} - R_{f,t} - \hat{\alpha}_i - \hat{\beta}_{mkt}(R_{m,t} - R_{f,t})\] \[- \hat{\beta}_{smb} SMB_t - \hat{\beta}_{hml} HML_t\]

On September 18, 2015, VW’s actual return was far below what its beta and the market return would predict.The large negative \(AR\) is the market’s verdict on Dieselgate.

Event Study Methodology

Step 5: Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR)

\[CAR_i[0, +5] = \sum_{t=0}^{5} AR_{i,t}\]

Why cumulate?

  • Markets may take several days to fully digest complex information
  • Day 0 captures the initial shock; days +1 to +5 capture revisions, analyst coverage, contagion effects, and information cascading through the market
  • A single day’s AR might miss the full story — CAR captures the total price impact

Connection to A3

In Assignment 3, you used pre-calculated CARs as dependent variables in cross-sectional regressions. Now you understand where those numbers came from — and in A5 you will calculate them yourself.

Event Study Methodology

The classic event study plot

This is the visual equivalent of the DiD plot you saw in L4 — but at daily frequency with the “treatment” being the scandal announcement.

Event Study Methodology

Expected results from Dieselgate

Key findings (what you should find in A5)

  • German automakers: significant negative CAR[0,+5]
  • Non-German automakers: smaller or insignificant CARs
  • VW hit hardest (direct responsibility), BMW and Mercedes affected by contagion / regulatory fears
  • Market Model and FF3 results should be similar — confirming robustness

Model comparison

  • If CARs from both models are highly correlated and close to the 45° line in a scatter plot → the expected return model is not driving your results
  • This is a robustness check — demonstrating that your conclusions do not depend on the specific benchmark
  • Differences, if any, reveal whether size/value factors are important for this particular sample

Event Study Methodology

Statistical testing

Once you have CARs, you need to test whether they are statistically significant:

Test 1: Is CAR ≠ 0?

  • One-sample t-test: \(H_0: \overline{CAR} = 0\)
  • Separately for German and non-German firms
  • A rejection tells you the event had a measurable price impact

Test 2: Do groups differ?

  • Two-sample t-test: \(H_0: \overline{CAR}_{German} = \overline{CAR}_{non-German}\)
  • Tests whether German firms were hit more than controls
  • This is the event study analog of the DiD treatment effect

Small sample warning

With only 3 German automakers (after dropping VW subsidiaries), t-tests have low statistical power. Interpret results in terms of economic magnitude alongside statistical significance.

Event Study Methodology

Cross-sectional analysis — “Who was hit hardest?”

After computing CARs, we can ask: what firm characteristics predict larger (or smaller) reactions?

\[CAR_i[0, +5] = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \text{German}_i + \gamma_2 \text{Size}_i + \gamma_3 \text{ROA}_i + \gamma_4 \text{Leverage}_i + u_i\]

  • This is a cross-sectional OLS regression — connecting back to L3
  • The dependent variable is the CAR you just calculated
  • \(\gamma_1\) captures the differential reaction for German firms
  • \(\gamma_2\) through \(\gamma_4\) test whether firm characteristics (size, profitability, leverage) amplify or dampen the reaction

This is exactly what you did in A3 — but now you understand the full pipeline from raw returns to CARs to cross-sectional tests.

Event Study Methodology

Practical considerations and pitfalls

Common challenges

  • Thin trading: Stocks that trade infrequently may have stale prices, biasing AR calculations
  • Event date ambiguity: Was the “real” event the EPA notice on September 18, or the media coverage on September 19, or earlier rumours? Sensitivity analysis with different event dates helps
  • Overlapping events: If another major announcement coincides with the event, the AR will capture both
  • Small samples: With few treated firms, statistical power is low and outliers are influential
  • Event window length: Shorter windows are cleaner but may miss delayed reactions; longer windows introduce noise

Event Study Methodology

Summary of event studies

Aspect Key point
When to use Market reactions to specific, well-dated events
Key assumption Market efficiency — prices reflect public information quickly
Identification Expected return model provides the counterfactual
Strengths Precise timing, clean identification in short windows
Limitations Single events, small N, model dependence for longer horizons
In A5 You implement the full pipeline on Dieselgate data

New Frontiers: Event Studies Meet Causal Inference

New Frontiers

Reframing event studies as causal inference

The classic event study asks: “What would this stock have returned absent the event?”

That is fundamentally a counterfactual question — the same question DiD asks, just at daily frequency. Goldsmith-Pinkham and Lyu (2025) make this connection explicit:

The traditional abnormal return \(AR_{i,t} = R_{i,t} - \hat{E}[R_{i,t}]\) is really an estimate of the average treatment effect on the treated — where the “treatment” is the event and the “counterfactual” comes from the factor model.

Same revolution, different setting

Just as Baker, Larcker, and Wang (2022) showed that standard TWFE can go wrong in staggered DiD, Goldsmith-Pinkham and Lyu (2025) show that standard abnormal return estimators can be biased when the factor model is wrong. The causal inference revolution is reaching event studies.

New Frontiers

When does the benchmark model matter?

Two dimensions determine how much trouble you face:

Short-run (days) Long-run (months/years)
Many events, random timing Model choice barely matters ✅ Model choice matters ⚠️
Single event It depends ⚠️ Almost always biased ❌

The intuition

  • Daily factor premiums are tiny (~0.02%). Over a 5-day window, misspecification error is negligible
  • But compound that over 250 trading days → up to 5 percentage points of bias
  • With many randomly timed events, factor realizations average out. With a single event, you are exposed to whatever the factors happened to do on that specific day
  • Dieselgate is a single event — we should be aware of this limitation, even though our short window provides protection

New Frontiers

When it goes wrong — A concrete example

Acemoglu et al. (2016) study firms connected to Timothy Geithner around his nomination as Treasury Secretary (November 21, 2008):

New Frontiers

When it goes wrong — A concrete example

Acemoglu et al. (2016) study firms connected to Timothy Geithner around his nomination as Treasury Secretary (November 21, 2008):

The setup

  • Single event, during the peak of the financial crisis
  • Non-random timing — event happened when factor realizations were extreme
  • Short horizon — but unusual market conditions

The finding

  • Standard methods (Market Model, FF3) → significant positive effects for connected firms
  • Synthetic control / gsynth methods → effects shrink dramatically toward zero
  • Why? The event coincided with extreme factor realizations. Standard models attribute part of the factor movement to the treatment effect

New Frontiers

When it goes wrong — A concrete example

Acemoglu et al. (2016) study firms connected to Timothy Geithner around his nomination as Treasury Secretary (November 21, 2008):

The setup

  • Single event, during the peak of the financial crisis
  • Non-random timing — event happened when factor realizations were extreme
  • Short horizon — but unusual market conditions

The lesson

  • with a single event in unusual market conditions, your factor model is doing heavy lifting
  • Robustness across models (like comparing Market Model vs. FF3) helps, but it is not a complete solution

New Frontiers

Alternative counterfactual approaches

Instead of assuming you know the right factor model, let the data construct the counterfactual:

Approach Key idea Connection
Synthetic control Weighted portfolio of control firms that matches pre-event returns Same as Abadie’s SCM from policy evaluation
GSynth / PCA regression Data-driven factor structure estimated from the pre-event period Lets the data find the factors instead of assuming them
Synthetic DiD Combines synthetic control weighting with DiD structure Bridges the two literatures

New Frontiers

Takeaway for your thesis

Practical guidance

  • Short-run, many events, random timing → Market Model / FF3 results are fine. Model choice barely matters (see Shleifer 1986)
  • Short-run, single event (like Dieselgate) → Be aware that factor realizations add noise. Comparing multiple models (as you do in A5) is a good robustness check
  • Long-run event studies → Seriously consider synthetic control or GSynth
  • General rule: If your Market Model and FF3 CARs agree closely, that is reassuring. If they disagree, dig into why

The good news: A5 uses a short event window [0,+5] and compares two benchmark models. If both tell the same story, your results are robust to the concerns raised by this new literature.

Fama–MacBeth Regression

Fama–MacBeth Regression

From event reactions to systematic patterns

Event studies ask: “Did this specific event move stock prices?”

A different question: “Do certain firm characteristics systematically predict returns across time?”

Examples

  • Does firm size predict cross-sectional return differences?
  • Is there a value premium — do high book-to-market firms outperform?
  • See Feng, Giglio, and Xiu (2020) for the factor zoo
  • openassetpricing.com by Chen and Zimmermann (2022)

Why a new method?

  • These are repeated cross-sectional questions, not event-specific
  • We need data across many time periods and many firms
  • Standard pooled OLS has a serious problem…

Fama–MacBeth Regression

The problem with pooled OLS

Cross-sectional correlation of residuals

When you pool all firm-month observations and run OLS, you implicitly assume residuals are independent across firms within the same period. But…

  • Firms are hit by common shocks (recessions, market crashes, policy changes)
  • On a bad day, most firms have negative residuals simultaneously
  • This means residuals within the same time period are correlated

The consequence

Pooled OLS dramatically understates standard errors, leading to inflated t-statistics and false conclusions about significance. This is similar to the Moulton problem from L4 — but the correlation is cross-sectional (across firms in the same period) rather than within-group over time.

Fama–MacBeth Regression

The Fama–MacBeth idea

Fama and MacBeth (1973) proposed an elegant two-step solution:

Step 1: For each month t, run a cross-sectional regression

Collect T slope coefficients \(\hat{\gamma}_{1,1}, \hat{\gamma}_{1,2}, \ldots, \hat{\gamma}_{1,T}\)

Step 2: Average the T coefficients and use their time-series variation for inference

\(\bar{\gamma}_1 = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \hat{\gamma}_{1,t} \quad \text{and} \quad SE(\bar{\gamma}_1) = \frac{s(\hat{\gamma}_{1,t})}{\sqrt{T}}\)

The key insight

Each cross-sectional regression produces one estimate per period. By treating these as a time series, you automatically account for cross-sectional correlation — because each \(\hat{\gamma}_{1,t}\) already incorporates whatever common shock happened in period \(t\).

Fama–MacBeth Regression

Step 1: Cross-sectional regressions

For each time period \(t\) (e.g. each month):

\[R_{i,t} = \gamma_{0,t} + \gamma_{1,t}\, X_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,t}\]

What this looks like

  • Each month is a separate cross-sectional regression
  • The dependent variable is the return for firm \(i\) in month \(t\)
  • The independent variable \(X_{i,t-1}\) is a firm characteristic lagged by one period to avoid look-ahead bias
  • Each regression produces its own slope \(\hat{\gamma}_{1,t}\)

Visual intuition

Imagine 3–4 scatter plots side by side, each showing one month’s cross-section: firm returns on the y-axis vs. a characteristic (e.g. ESG score) on the x-axis. Each scatter plot has its own fitted line. The slopes vary from month to month — some steep, some flat, some negative. FM collects all these slopes and asks: on average, is the slope positive?

Fama–MacBeth Regression

Step 2: Time-series average

\[\bar{\gamma}_1 = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \hat{\gamma}_{1,t}\]

The average slope across all periods is our estimate of the systematic relationship between the characteristic and returns — the risk premium, if you are thinking in asset pricing terms.

Fama–MacBeth Regression

Step 3: Standard errors

\[SE(\bar{\gamma}_1) = \frac{s(\hat{\gamma}_{1,t})}{\sqrt{T}}\]

where \(s(\hat{\gamma}_{1,t})\) is the standard deviation of the \(T\) estimated slopes.

Why this solves the problem

Pooled OLS treats each firm-month as independent → too many “observations.” FM recognizes that there are only \(T\) independent cross-sections. The time-series variation in \(\hat{\gamma}_{1,t}\) reflects the true uncertainty about the average relationship. If the slope is stable over time, SE is small; if it bounces around, SE is large.

Fama–MacBeth Regression

Visualizing the distribution of slopes

What the distribution tells you

  • Slopes tightly clustered around a positive value → strong, stable evidence that the characteristic predicts returns
  • Slopes widely dispersed around zero → no reliable relationship; sometimes positive, sometimes negative
  • Slopes with a clear positive mean but large variance → the relationship exists on average but is noisy period-by-period

This distribution is the core diagnostic of Fama–MacBeth. It shows you not just the average effect, but how consistent it is over time.

Fama–MacBeth Regression

Comparison: FM vs. pooled OLS vs. panel FE

Aspect Pooled OLS Panel FE (L4) Fama–MacBeth
Problem addressed Time-invariant confounders Cross-sectional correlation of residuals
How Single regression on all data Entity & time fixed effects Repeated cross-sectional regressions
SE adjustment None (or robust/clustered) Cluster by entity or time Time-series variation of coefficients
Typical use Baseline specification Corporate finance panels Asset pricing, return predictability
Assumes Independence Parallel trends, no time-varying confounders Stable cross-sectional relationship
Risk Overstated significance Absorbs too much variation Imprecise first-stage estimates (EIV)

When to use FM vs. clustered SE?

Petersen (2008) shows that FM and clustering by time address the same problem (cross-sectional correlation). In practice, double-clustering (by firm and time) is a modern alternative. FM remains standard for asset pricing tests because of its interpretability: the distribution of \(\hat{\gamma}_{1,t}\) values is informative in its own right.

Fama–MacBeth Regression

Applications in published research

Fama–MacBeth is everywhere in asset pricing and corporate finance:

  • Original CAPM tests: Fama and MacBeth (1973) tested whether market beta explains cross-sectional return variation
  • Fama–French factor tests: Do SMB and HML factors carry a risk premium?
  • ESG and returns: Does environmental or social performance predict returns?
  • Liquidity premiums: Do less-liquid stocks earn higher returns?
  • Anomaly research: Size, value, momentum, profitability, investment — nearly all tested via FM

If you read a finance paper that reports “Fama–MacBeth regressions,” you now know exactly what the authors did and why.

Fama–MacBeth Regression

Limitations

  • Errors-in-variables (EIV): The first-stage coefficients \(\hat{\gamma}_{1,t}\) are estimated with error, which attenuates the second-stage average toward zero. The Shanken correction adjusts for this, but adds complexity, see Kim (1995) and Shanken (1992).
  • Persistence in characteristics: FM assumes cross-sections are relatively independent over time. If firm characteristics are highly persistent (e.g. firm size barely changes month-to-month), FM may underperform double-clustered SE approaches
  • Balanced panel preference: FM works best when each cross-section has a similar set of firms. If the firm universe changes dramatically over time, the \(\hat{\gamma}_{1,t}\) estimates may not be comparable
  • Modern alternatives: Double-clustered standard errors (Petersen 2008) address the same problem and are easier to implement in standard software

Fama–MacBeth Regression

Summary

Aspect Key point
When to use Testing whether firm characteristics systematically predict returns over time
Key insight Two-step procedure that automatically handles cross-sectional correlation
Step 1 Run a cross-sectional regression for each time period
Step 2 Average the coefficients; use time-series variation for SE
Strengths Interpretable, widely used, addresses cross-sectional correlation
Limitations EIV bias, assumes stable relationship, balanced panel preferred
Alternative Double-clustered SE (Petersen, 2009) for the same problem

Synthesis

Synthesis

The complete methods toolkit

Lecture Method Identifies Data structure Key assumption
L3 OLS + controls Cross-sectional relationships Cross-section No omitted variables (selection on observables)
L4 DiD / Panel FE Causal effect of treatment Panel Parallel trends
L5 Event study Market reaction to specific events Daily panel Market efficiency + correct factor model
L5 Fama–MacBeth Systematic return predictability Repeated cross-sections Cross-sections are independent draws

Each method trades off different assumptions. The art of empirical finance is choosing the method whose assumptions are most credible for your specific research question and data.

Synthesis

Standard errors: A unifying thread

The standard error story has been building across the course:

  • L3: Heteroskedasticity-robust SE → solves non-constant variance
  • L4: Cluster-robust SE → handles within-group correlation (Moulton problem)
  • L5: Fama–MacBeth SE → handles cross-sectional correlation of residuals

All three address the same fundamental issue: when residuals are not independent, naive standard errors are too small. The solution is always to match the inference method to the correlation structure of the data.

The common thread

The choice of standard error is not a technicality, it is a statement about what you believe is independent in your data. Getting it wrong can flip your conclusions from significant to insignificant (or vice versa).

Synthesis

Connection to A5

Assignment 5 asks you to:

  1. Load daily stock return data for auto firms
  2. Drop VW subsidiaries to avoid mechanical linkages
  3. Define estimation [−120, −30] and event [0, +5] windows
  4. Estimate Market Model and Fama–French 3-Factor expected returns
  5. Calculate abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR)
  6. Create the classic event study visualization
  7. Conduct cross-sectional tests on CARs

This is the full event study pipeline from raw data to publishable results. Everything from today’s lecture maps directly onto specific assignment tasks.

Synthesis

Connection to your thesis

Both methods from today are staples of finance research:

  • Event studies appear in papers on M&A announcements, earnings surprises, regulatory changes, CEO turnovers, patent issuances, and many more corporate events
  • Fama–MacBeth is the standard approach for testing asset pricing models and cross-sectional return predictability

For your replication project

Understanding the mechanics, assumptions, and limitations of the applied methods puts you in a strong position to critically evaluate and extend the original analysis.

Synthesis

Looking ahead — L6: Replication Workshop

In the final lecture, we bring everything together:

  • How to read and replicate a published paper, seagway through Huck (2024) before next lecture
  • Connecting methods (OLS, DiD, event studies, FM) to research designs
  • Common pitfalls in replication work
  • How to extend a replication for your thesis

Key message from this course

The methods are tools, not ends in themselves. The value is in understanding when each tool is appropriate, what it assumes, and how to interpret the results in the context of a real research question.

Thank You for Your Attention!

See You in the Final Lecture!

References

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, Amir Kermani, James Kwak, and Todd Mitton. 2016. “The Value of Connections in Turbulent Times: Evidence from the United States.” Journal of Financial Economics 121 (2): 368–91.
Baker, Andrew C, David F Larcker, and Charles CY Wang. 2022. “How Much Should We Trust Staggered Difference-in-Differences Estimates?” Journal of Financial Economics 144 (2): 370–95.
Chen, Andrew Y., and Tom Zimmermann. 2022. “Open Source Cross-Sectional Asset Pricing.” Critical Finance Review 27 (2): 207–64.
Fama, Eugene F. 1970. “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work.” The Journal of Finance 25 (2): 383–417.
Fama, Eugene F, and Kenneth R French. 1993. “Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds.” Journal of Financial Economics 33 (1): 3–56.
Fama, Eugene F, and James D MacBeth. 1973. “Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests.” Journal of Political Economy 81 (3): 607–36.
Feng, Guanhao, Stefano Giglio, and Dacheng Xiu. 2020. “Taming the Factor Zoo: A Test of New Factors.” The Journal of Finance 75 (3): 1327–70.
Goldsmith-Pinkham, Paul, and Tianshu Lyu. 2025. “Causal Inference in Financial Event Studies.” https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.15123.
Huck, John R. 2024. “The Psychological Externalities of Investing: Evidence from Stock Returns and Crime.” The Review of Financial Studies 37 (7): 2273–2314.
Kim, Dongcheol. 1995. “The Errors in the Variables Problem in the Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns.” The Journal of Finance 50 (5): 1605–34.
Kolari, James W, and Seppo Pynnönen. 2010. “Event Study Testing with Cross-Sectional Correlation of Abnormal Returns.” The Review of Financial Studies 23 (11): 3996–4025.
MacKinlay, A Craig. 1997. “Event Studies in Economics and Finance.” Journal of Economic Literature 35 (1): 13–39.
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Appendix

Appendix

MacKinlay (1997) — The classic event study reference

MacKinlay (1997) established the modern event study framework:

  • Formalized the estimation window / event window structure
  • Showed that the Market Model dominates simpler approaches (mean-adjusted, market-adjusted)
  • Provided test statistics for single-firm and multi-firm event studies
  • Discussed parametric and non-parametric tests

This paper remains the default citation for event study methodology. Nearly every event study paper begins with a sentence like: “We follow the standard event study methodology of MacKinlay (1997).”

Appendix

Fama & French (1993) — Factor construction

How SMB and HML are constructed

  • SMB: Sort all stocks by market capitalization into two groups (small, big). SMB = return of small portfolio − return of big portfolio
  • HML: Sort all stocks by book-to-market ratio into three groups (low, medium, high). HML = return of high B/M portfolio − return of low B/M portfolio
  • Both factors are rebalanced annually and returns are computed daily or monthly

Why these factors?

Fama and French (1993) documented that size and value explain a large share of cross-sectional return variation that CAPM beta alone cannot. Whether these reflect risk or mispricing remains debated — but the empirical regularity is well-established.

Appendix

Petersen (2008) — Choosing the right standard errors

Petersen (2008) provides a decision framework:

Correlation structure Solution
Firm effect (residuals correlated within firm over time) Cluster by firm
Time effect (residuals correlated across firms within period) Cluster by time, or Fama–MacBeth
Both Double-cluster by firm AND time

Key finding: Fama–MacBeth and clustering by time produce similar standard errors when the number of time periods is large. Double-clustering is more general and handles both dimensions simultaneously.

Appendix

Event study cross-sectional correlation

Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) address a subtle issue: even in short-window event studies, abnormal returns may be cross-sectionally correlated when the event affects multiple firms simultaneously (as in Dieselgate).

Standard event study tests assume independence across firms. When this fails:

  • Aggregate test statistics are inflated
  • The adjusted BMP test accounts for cross-sectional correlation in ARs
  • Alternative: bootstrap methods that resample clusters of firms

This matters for Dieselgate because all German automakers are hit by the same event on the same day — their ARs are not independent draws.

Appendix

Goldsmith-Pinkham & Lyu (2024) — Key results summary

Three empirical examples

  1. Geithner connections (single event, non-random timing): Standard methods overstate effects; synthetic control finds near-zero effects
  2. S&P 500 index inclusion (many events, random timing): All methods agree in the short run — model choice does not matter
  3. M&A acquirer returns (many events, quasi-random): Short-run effects similar across methods; long-run effects diverge substantially

Key takeaways

  • Short-run + random timing → classical methods work well
  • Single event OR long horizon → factor model misspecification can seriously bias results
  • Synthetic control and GSynth are robust alternatives, especially for long-horizon studies
  • The bias compounds over time: a daily misspecification of 0.02% becomes 5% over a year